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Abstract 
 
The current study examined whether a sample of detained male adolescents (n = 107; 
Mean age = 15.50; SD = 1.30) could be disaggregated into two distinct groups, consistent with 
past research on primary and secondary variants of callous-unemotional (CU) traits in 
adolescents.  This study also sought to determine a possible explanation for the CU traits among 
youth in the secondary variant by examining whether they differ from primary variants on 
measures of cognitive and affective empathy.  Using Latent Profile Analyses, two groups of 
adolescents high on CU traits were identified, a large group (n = 30) high on CU traits but low 
on anxiety (primary) and a smaller group high on both CU traits and anxiety (n = 10; secondary).  
Using self-report and computerized measures of affective (e.g., emotional reactivity) and 
cognitive empathy (e.g., affective facial recognition and theory of mind (ToM)), results revealed 
that the secondary variant demonstrated the lowest levels of cognitive empathy.  In contrast, the 
primary variant demonstrated the lowest levels of self-report affective empathy, but these levels 
were not significantly different from the secondary variant.  Multiple regression analyses testing 
the association among measures of empathy, CU traits, and anxiety produced a mostly consistent 
pattern of results.  One exception was the finding of an interaction between CU traits and anxiety 
in the prediction of fear recognition accuracy that indicated that CU traits were positively 
associated with accuracy in recognizing fearful facial expressions when anxiety was low.  The 
current study builds upon previous work examining primary and secondary variants of CU traits 
by suggesting that both primary and secondary variants may exhibit similar deficits in affective 
empathy, but that secondary variants may also exhibit deficits in cognitive empathy and 
perspective-taking that are not present in primary variants. 
ix 
 
Key Words: Callous-Unemotional Traits, Affective Empathy, Cognitive Empathy, Adolescence, 
Theory of Mind
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Introduction 
Psychopathy is a serious personality disorder in adults that is characterized by a constellation 
of interpersonal (i.e., glibness), affective (i.e., lack of empathy), and behavioral (i.e., antisocial) 
features (Cleckley, 1976).  The affective features of psychopathy, also referred to as callous-
unemotional (CU) traits (e.g., lack of empathy/remorse, shallow affect, callousness), constitute a 
core component of psychopathy (Cleckley, 1976; Hart & Hare, 1996) and are frequently studied 
among youth populations as a downward extension of psychopathy (Frick, 2009).  In support of 
this extension, evidence suggests that CU traits in childhood and adolescence are predictive of 
psychopathy in adulthood, even after controlling for conduct disorder and other childhood risk 
factors (Burke, Loeber, & Lahey, 2007; Lynam, Caspi, Moffitt, Loeber, & Stouthamer-Loeber, 
2007).    
Youth with CU traits are believed to demarcate a unique subgroup of antisocial youth 
whose behavior tends to be more severe and violent in nature.  For example, recent qualitative 
(Frick & Dickens, 2006; Frick & White, 2008; Pardini & Fite, 2010) and quantitative
 
(Edens, 
Campbell, & Weir, 2007; Leistico, Salekin, Decoster, & Rogers, 2008) reviews indicate that 
psychopathic or CU traits predict a more severe, stable, and aggressive pattern of behavior in 
antisocial youth.  In addition, antisocial youths with CU traits show a large number of genetic, 
neurocognitive, emotional, personality, and social differences compared to antisocial youths 
without these traits (see Frick, Ray, Thornton, & Kahn, 2014; Frick & Viding, 2009; Frick & 
White, 2008, for reviews).   
Given the extensive empirical evidence to support the utility of CU traits in designating 
an important subgroup of antisocial youth, the most recent revision of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) has integrated 
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this construct into the diagnostic criteria for conduct disorder.  Specifically, the specifier “with 
Limited Prosocial Emotions” designates those youth with serious conduct problems who also 
show elevated rates of CU traits.  A child or adolescent has to meet full criteria for CD and 
exhibit two of the following four traits over at least a 12-month period: lack of remorse or guilt, 
callous-lack of empathy, unconcern about performance at school or work, and shallow or 
deficient affect.  In light of this recent change, further research is needed to understand the 
potential causes of CU traits, the characteristics of individuals with CU traits, and the 
implications of these causes and characteristics for guiding optimal assessment and treatment 
practices.  One especially important focus of research is whether there are distinct developmental 
pathways that can lead to CU traits. 
Psychopathy as a Heterogeneous Construct 
While psychopathy has historically been viewed as a homogenous construct, a recent 
review of seminal theories and empirical work provides compelling evidence that there may be 
distinct variants of psychopathy with potentially different etiologies (Skeem, Poythress, Edens, 
Lilienfeld, & Cale, 2003).  In an early and influential theoretical model, Karpman (1941, 1948a) 
proposed a theory of two psychopathy subtypes.  Specifically, Karpman (1941, 1948a) theorized 
that primary psychopathy is characterized by an innate or heritable affective deficit, while 
secondary psychopathy is characterized by an affective deficit produced by adaptation to 
environmental factors such as parental rejection, abuse, or trauma.  He emphasized that the 
divergent etiology of these variants was crucial for understanding the underlying motivation of 
psychopathic behavior and thus could be important for treatment (Karpman, 1941, 1948a).  At 
the same time, Karpman (1941) also noted that individuals falling into these two categories 
would be indistinguishable by their callous, irresponsible, and antisocial behavior, but could be 
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differentiated by the presence of anxiety and their type of aggression.  Karpman argued that 
those within the secondary variant would show elevated rates of anxiety and engage in more 
reactive aggressive behavior, while those falling into the primary variant would not show signs 
of anxiety and demonstrate planned or more proactive means of carrying out aggression 
(Karpman, 1948b). 
A substantial amount of research supports many of the core features of Karpman‟s model.  
Specifically, research on adults confirms that individuals high on psychopathic traits can be 
meaningfully split into two distinct groups based on their levels of trait anxiety.  Groups with low 
levels of anxiety (i.e., primary psychopathy) frequently show deficits in laboratory tasks measuring 
passive avoidance (Arnett, Smith, & Newman, 1997; Newman & Schmitt, 1988) and responses to 
emotional stimuli (Hiatt, Lorenz, Newman, 2002; Newman, Schmitt, & Voss, 1997; Sutton, Vitale, 
& Newman, 2002).  Research also indicates that groups with high levels of anxiety (i.e., secondary 
psychopathy) show higher levels of past child abuse and trauma in incarcerated adult samples 
(Blagov et al., 2011; Poythress et al., 2010).  
Importantly, past research in adult populations has demonstrated that these two variants of 
psychopathy may not differ in their level of CU traits (Blagov et al., 2011; Hicks, Markon, Patrick, 
Krueger, & Newman, 2004; Poythress et al., 2010; but see Vassileva, Kosson, Abramowitz, & 
Conrad, 2005).  However, they may differ on other dimensions of psychopathy, such as 
impulsivity and aggressive behavior.  For example, Skeem and colleagues (2003) suggested that 
the secondary variant may demonstrate more difficulties in emotion regulation and thus would be 
more likely to show higher levels of hostility, aggression and impulsivity.  This assertion has 
largely been supported in adult samples when measuring aggression (Falkenbach, Poythress, & 
Creevy, 2008; Hicks et al., 2004; Vidal, Skeem, & Camp, 2010; but see Poythress et al., 2010) and 
4 
 
impulsivity (Blagov et al, 2011; Poythress et al., 2010; Vassileva et al., 2005; but see Skeem, 
Johansson, Andershed, Kerr, & Eno Louden,  2007). 
Extension to CU Variants in Youth 
Although the research on variants of psychopathy prior to adulthood has been limited, 
there have been promising findings in samples of clinic-referred and incarcerated adolescents.  
As in adult samples, research in adolescent populations suggest that individuals high on 
psychopathy or CU traits can be meaningfully split into two distinct groups based on their levels 
of trait anxiety.  Those individuals in the group defined as primary psychopathy display low 
levels of anxiety, while those in the group defined as secondary psychopathy demonstrate high 
levels of anxiety (Kahn et al., 2013; Kimonis, Frick, Cauffman, Goldweber, & Skeem, 2012; Lee, 
Salekin, & Iselin, 2010; Sharf, Kimonis, & Howard, 2014).  Consistent with adult samples, 
research among adolescents also suggests that the variant high on anxiety (i.e., secondary 
psychopathy) shows higher levels of past child abuse and trauma (Kahn et al., 2013; Kimonis, 
Skeem, Cauffman, & Dmitrieva, 2011; Sharf et al., 2014; Tatar, Cauffman, Kimonis, & Skeem, 
2012; Vaughn, Edens, Howard, & Smith, 2009).  Also consistent with adult samples, the two 
variants do not differ on their level of CU traits, but the group high on anxiety is more impulsive 
(Kahn et al., 2013; Kimonis et al., 2012).  This high anxiety variant also shows more problems 
with depression, anger, and aggression (Kahn et al., 2013; Kimonis, et al., 2012; Kimonis et al., 
2011; Lee et al., 2010; Vaughn, et al., 2009).  Also consistent with the research on adults (Hiatt 
et al., 2002; Newman, et al., 1997; Sutton et al., 2002), the low anxiety variant (i.e., primary 
psychopathy) shows deficits in their processing of emotional stimuli that are not apparent in the 
secondary variant (Kimonis et al., 2012).  For instance, Kimonis and colleagues (2012) found 
that when using an Emotional Pictures Dot-Probe Task, the secondary variant did not show 
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deficits in the processing of emotional stimuli depicting distress in others, while the primary 
variant did show these deficits. 
Taken together, the results of these studies suggest that causal models proposed to 
explain the development of CU traits need to consider these two variants with very different 
characteristics.  Further, these differing characteristics are consistent with theories suggesting 
that CU traits in the primary variant are a result of an emotional deficit related to low behavioral 
inhibition that can interfere with the development of empathy, guilt, and other aspects of 
conscience (Kimonis et al., 2012).  In contrast, individuals in the secondary variant appear to 
have problems in emotional and behavioral regulation that could result from abuse and other 
trauma early in development (Kimonis et al., 2012).  These empirical findings and theoretical 
interpretations raise an important question.  If the secondary variant does not show deficits in the 
processing of emotional stimuli depicting distress in others, why do they still show elevated 
levels of CU traits?  One line of research may provide some data to help address this question.  
This area of research focuses on the distinct components involved in empathic processing.   
Empathy as a Multidimensional Process 
The construct of empathy is important for understanding youth with high levels of CU 
traits not only because lack of empathy, in part, defines the construct of CU traits, but also 
because empathy is believed to play a key role in social cognition and prosocial behavior 
(Decety, 2010).  For instance, empathy is thought to be important in the inhibition of aggression 
and promotion of prosocial behavior (Eisenberg & Eggum, 2009).  To this end, shared negative 
arousal between individuals often results in distress, and serves as a signal that activates 
empathic concern and thus promotes prosocial behavior.  When this shared arousal is absent, 
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there is no motivation to act in order to decrease any discomfort promoted by the negative 
arousal (Decety & Michalska, 2010).  
Due to its complexity, empathy has been defined in a variety of a ways.  From a 
developmental standpoint, empathy is typically defined as an affective response or arousal that is 
derived from understanding another‟s emotional state or feelings in a particular situation 
(Eisenberg, Shea, Carlo, & Knight, 1991).  These and other common definitions of empathy 
emphasize the affective components; however, it is widely accepted that empathy includes both 
affective and cognitive components that differ in their developmental trajectories (Baron-Cohen 
& Wheelwright, 2004; Davis, 1980; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Eisenberg & Eggum, 2009; 
Hodges & Klein, 2001).  In general, affective features are typically defined as arousal to or 
resonation and congruence with another‟s emotional state (Blair, 2005; Hoffman, 1987; Singer & 
Lamm, 2009).  In contrast, cognitive empathy is often considered synonymous with perspective-
taking abilities, such as being able to imagine or take the perspective of another in order to 
understand what they may be feeling (Davis, 1980; Davis, 1983; Decety, 2010).  While cognitive 
and affective components are both involved in the process of empathy, their developmental 
trajectories differ in course and complexity.  
Affective Empathy.  In terms of developmental sequence, there is strong evidence that 
affective components of empathy begin to develop prior to the cognitive components (Decety, 
2010).  For instance, signs of affective empathy can be seen at very early ages, with infants as 
young as 12 months of age showing comfort to others in distress (Warneken & Tomasello, 2009).  
Furthermore, affective responsiveness, or emotional contagion, is present among infants, as they 
become distressed and cry when exposed to other crying newborns (Dondi, Simion, & Caltran, 
1999).  Importantly, this developmental sequence shows that the ability to perceive and respond 
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appropriately to other‟s affective expression occurs early in development, prior to the 
development of a sense of self, which is necessary for the process of cognitive empathy 
(Hastings, Zahn-Waxler, & McShane, 2006).  
Considering that CU traits are defined in part by a lack of concern about another‟s 
feelings, it is not surprising that many studies have consistently found support for affective 
empathy deficits in youth with high levels of CU traits (Chabrol, Van Leeuwen, Rodgers, & 
Gibbs, 2011; Dadds et al., 2009; Dadds, Cauchi, Wimalaweera, Hawes, Brennan, 2012; Jones, 
Happe, Gilbert, Burnett, & Viding, 2010; Pardini & Byrd, 2012; Pardini, Lochman, & Frick, 
2003).  For example, in a sample of 4
th
 and 5
th
 grade urban school children, Pardini and Byrd 
(2012) found that CU traits were negatively associated with both measures of empathic sadness 
and empathic concern.  Similarly, in a sample of children and adolescents age 9 to 16, Jones and 
colleagues (2010) found youth with higher levels of CU traits were less likely to report „feeling 
bad‟ about an aggressive act they committed and were also less likely to care about the victim‟s 
feelings compared to children without CU traits.  A more recent electroencephalography (EEG) 
study found that when exposed to images of others in distress, youth with high levels of CU traits 
are less likely to become aroused compared to youth with low levels of CU traits (Cheng, Hung, 
& Decety, 2012).  Thus, there is consistent support for affective empathy deficits among CU 
youth.   
Cognitive Empathy.  Unlike affective empathy, cognitive empathy can begin to be 
measured by the age of 4, when children start to use perspective-taking processes to understand 
that the way a person feels about an event depends upon that person‟s particular perception of 
that event (Decety, 2010; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).  Although children have 
knowledge about mental states and can attribute them to others by the age of 2 (Bretherton, 
8 
 
McNew, & Beeghley-Smith, 1981), they have not yet acquired the ability to understand 
representational states in order to infer what others might think or believe until approximately 4 
years of age (Perner, 1991).  Identification of facial affect is one way in which mental states are 
attributed to others.  Past research has found that facial affect recognition is present by the pre-
school years (Reichenbach & Masters, 1983) but that the level of accuracy improves into the 
adolescent years (Kolb, Wilson, & Taylor, 1992; Tonks, Williams, Frampton, Yates, & Slater, 
2007).  
When examining cognitive empathy deficits among children with elevated CU traits, 
results are mixed.  Among the extant research, some studies have shown that youth with high 
levels of CU traits show deficits in cognitive empathy when measured by affective facial 
recognition (Dadds et al., 2009) or self-reports of perspective-taking (Chabrol et al., 2011; 
Pardini et al., 2003).  However, other studies employing emotion recognition (Schwenck et al., 
2012; Dadds et al., 2012) or cognitive perspective-taking tasks (Anastassiou-Hadjicharalambous 
& Warden, 2008; Cheng et al., 2012; Jones et al., 2010) found youth high on CU traits did not 
exhibit deficits in cognitive empathy.  Importantly, the study by Dadds and colleagues (2009) 
suggests age differences in the association between empathy and CU traits.  Specifically, this 
study found that parent reported CU traits were associated with both emotional and cognitive 
empathy deficits in boys under the age of nine, but they were unrelated to cognitive empathy 
deficits after this age (Dadds et al., 2009).  These findings suggest that youth with CU traits may 
be more likely to exhibit deficits in cognitive empathy earlier on (along with affective empathy 
deficits) but learn perspective-taking later in development.   
Theory of Mind.  The cognitive component of empathy is closely related to the construct 
of theory of mind (ToM).  Specifically, ToM is defined as the ability to attribute self and other‟s 
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mental states, including intentions, beliefs, and knowledge (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  In fact, 
several authors have proposed that cognitive empathy is the same as ToM (Blair, 2005; Decety, 
2010).  The process of attribution involved in ToM is necessary for predicting and appropriately 
responding to another‟s behavior, thus forming a crucial component of social skills during 
development (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985).   
Research suggests that the acquisition of ToM follows a predictable developmental 
pattern (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998).  Specifically, ToM begins to manifest around 18 
months of age in the form of joint attention (i.e., using direct gaze or gestures to share a common 
interest) and protodeclarative pointing (i.e., pointing to share enjoyment with others; Baron-
Cohen, 1989; 1995).  At 3 to 4 years of age, children are able to understand false belief, or that 
other people may possess beliefs that are incorrect and different from their own, which is 
typically referred to as first-order false belief (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Wimmer & Perner, 
1983).  Around 6 to 7 years of age, children begin to understand that other individuals possess 
beliefs about what a third person thinks (second-order false belief; Perner & Wimmer, 1985).  
More subtle and advanced ToM abilities begin to solidify at ages 9 to 11 when children 
recognize and understand faux pas, which requires attribution of two mental states.  A faux pas 
occurs when someone doesn‟t realize they should not say something to someone because the 
person hearing it would feel hurt or insulted (Baron-Cohen, O‟Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 
1999).   
More recent and advanced conceptualizations of ToM suggest that ToM abilities are 
composed of both affective and cognitive components that may rely on different capabilities and 
recruit different brain regions (Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger, Goldsher, & Aharon-Peretz, 
2005).  For instance, Shamay-Tsoory and colleagues (2005) outline a model differentiating 
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cognitive ToM, which is defined as the ability to make inferences about others‟ beliefs or 
intentions, from affective ToM, which is defined as the ability to make inferences about others‟ 
emotions (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005).  Within the broader framework of empathic processing, 
Shamay-Tsoory and colleagues (2010) have proposed that affective ToM requires integration of 
both cognitive ToM and emotional contagion (Shamay-Tsoory, Harari, Aharon-Peretz, & 
Levkovitz, 2010).  Emerging research provides support for the conceptualization of ToM as a 
multi-component process.  Specifically, findings from brain imaging research suggest distinct 
brain regions become activated when participants are asked to complete tasks aimed at assessing 
cognitive vs. affective ToM abilities (Kalbe et al., 2010; Sebastian et al., 2012a).  Given that 
ToM is closely related to the construct of cognitive empathy and given that ToM is composed of 
distinct affective and cognitive components, it is important to understand how youth with CU 
traits may perform on tasks measuring ToM. 
However, the literature examining the association between performance on ToM tasks 
and CU traits is limited.  When measuring ToM as a unitary construct, studies in adult 
populations report that individuals with high levels of psychopathic traits do not show 
impairment in ToM (Blair et al., 1996; Richell et al., 2003; Widom, 1978).  However, more 
recent research in adolescents has shown that CU traits specifically, are negatively associated 
with performance on ToM tasks (Sharp & Vanwoerden, 2014), even after controlling for levels 
of impulsivity and narcissism (Stellwagen & Kerig, 2013).  Findings from the few studies that 
have examined cognitive and affective components of ToM independently are mixed (Sebastian 
et al., 2012b; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010).  For example, among incarcerated adults, Shamay-
Tsoory and colleagues (2010) found those with high levels of psychopathic traits showed deficits 
in affective ToM but not cognitive ToM abilities.  Specifically, after controlling for intelligence 
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level, offenders with high levels of psychopathic traits had significantly lower accuracy scores on 
tasks of affective ToM, but not cognitive ToM, in comparison to a healthy control group from 
the community.  These accuracy scores in the affective condition, but not cognitive condition, 
were also significantly and negatively correlated (r = -.49) with scores from a self-report 
measure of psychopathy (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010).  However, in a study of community youth, 
no differences were found in behavioral performance on cognitive and affective ToM scenarios 
between typically developing youth and a conduct problems group with significantly higher 
levels of CU traits (Sebastian et al., 2012b). 
Taken together, the available research suggests that youth with high levels of CU traits 
consistently demonstrate deficits in affective empathy, but the results for cognitive empathy or 
ToM are mixed with some studies providing support for deficits in youth with CU traits and 
others failing to find support for these deficits.  There could be a number of explanations for 
these findings, including the explanation provided above that the cognitive deficits are not 
consistent across age.  However, these inconsistent results may also be due to the possibility that 
there are differences in the empathy deficits across the different variants of CU traits.  
Specifically, it is possible that the primary variant experiences deficits in affective empathy, due 
to a failure to become aroused to the cues of distress in others, whereas the secondary variant 
shows cognitive empathy deficits due to a failure to develop cognitive perspective skills as a 
result of their problems in emotional regulation.  These difficulties in emotion regulation, as well 
as a failure to develop cognitive perspective skills, could be the result of experiencing 
maltreatment during childhood, which has shown a higher prevalence rate in secondary variants 
(e.g., Kahn et al., 2013; Kimonis et al., 2011). 
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Statement of Problem 
To summarize, current research suggests that youth high on CU traits can be meaningfully 
split into two distinct groups based on their level of trait anxiety (e.g., Kahn et al., 2013).  
Specifically, a primary variant does not show elevated levels of trait anxiety but does show deficits 
in the processing of emotional stimuli, especially in response to distress in others, that are not 
apparent in the secondary variant.  In contrast a secondary variant displays higher levels of anxiety 
and demonstrates greater histories of childhood abuse and trauma than the primary variant.  
Furthermore, the secondary variant demonstrates more difficulties in emotion regulation including 
higher levels of impulsivity, as well as problems with depression, anger, and aggression.  However, 
the secondary variant does not show a deficit in the processing of emotional stimuli that is 
displayed by the primary variant. 
The differences between these variants have resulted in several theories proposing distinct 
etiological pathways for these two groups high on CU traits.  Specifically, the primary variant has 
been proposed to be the result of an emotional deficit related to low behavioral inhibition that can 
interfere with the development of empathy, guilt, and other important aspects of conscience 
(Kimonis et al., 2012).  In contrast, the secondary variant has been proposed to be the result of 
deficits in emotional and behavioral regulation that result from abuse and other trauma early in 
development (Kimonis et al., 2012).  What is not clear from these etiological theories is why, if the 
second group shows emotional arousal to the distress in others, they still show elevated levels of 
CU traits.   
The current study tests one possible explanation for lack of empathy in youths high on 
CU traits and high on anxiety (i.e., secondary variant).  Specifically, I test the possibility that the 
secondary variant will still show empathy deficits, leading to their CU traits, but that the type of 
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empathy deficit will differ from the empathy deficit shown by the primary variant.  Research 
examining cognitive and affective empathy deficits in CU youth separately finds consistent 
support for deficits in affective empathy among youth with elevated levels of CU traits; however, 
research on deficits in cognitive empathy among youth high on CU traits is less consistent.  
These inconsistent results may be due to the possibility that the primary variant is more likely to 
experience deficits in affective empathy due to a failure to become aroused to the cues of distress 
in others.  The secondary variant, on the other hand, shows more deficits in cognitive empathy 
due to a failure to develop cognitive perspective skills as a result of their problems in emotional 
regulation and hypervigilance to threat cues because of their history of abuse.  Thus, they may 
dedicate less cognitive resources to non-threat related emotions, such as distress in others.  
Hypotheses 
This explanation for the development of CU traits within these two groups leads to 
several predictions that have not been investigated to date and that were the focus of the current 
study.  The current study used latent profile analyses (LPA) in a sample of detained male 
adolescents to test whether distinct groups emerge that differ on CU traits and level of anxiety.  
Detained adolescents were studied in order to use a sample that likely displays high rates of CU 
traits.  Based on past research it was hypothesized that at least three groups of youth will be 
identified: a group high on CU traits and high on anxiety (secondary variant), a group high on 
CU traits and low on anxiety (primary variant), and a group low on CU traits and anxiety.  
Several predicted differences between these three groups were tested.  The first 
hypothesis was that the primary and secondary variant would differ on both self-report of 
affective and cognitive empathy as well as performance on computerized tasks designed to 
measure aspects of affective and cognitive empathy.  Specifically, it was hypothesized that the 
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primary variant would score lower on self-reports of affective empathy as well as demonstrate 
greater deficits on a computerized task assessing aspects of affective empathy 
(facilitation/attention to emotion pictures) compared to the secondary variant and a low CU 
group.  In contrast, it was hypothesized that the secondary variant would score lower on self-
reports of cognitive empathy, a computerized task of cognitive empathy (emotion recognition of 
facial stimuli), as well as a measure assessing affective and cognitive Theory of Mind (ToM) 
compared to the primary variant and low CU group.   
Methods 
Participants 
One hundred twelve male participants, age 12 to 20, were recruited from three secure 
detention facilities in the Southeastern United States:  Rivarde Detention Center in Harvey, LA, 
the Youth Study Center in New Orleans, LA, and the Terrebonne Juvenile Detention Center in 
Houma, LA.  Youth in all three facilities had been arrested and judged to be in need of secure 
placement prior to being adjudicated for the offense.  Participants were selected for inclusion 
based on parental consent/youth assent, availability to fill out questionnaires, and availability of 
their juvenile justice charts for review.  A total of n = 5 participants were excluded from the 
analysis due to low IQ scores (IQ < 65).  This led to a final sample of n = 107 with a mean age of 
15.50 (SD = 1.30) years.  The primary ethnic category was African American (79%) with the 
remaining sample identifying as Caucasian (14%), Hispanic (5%), and Other (2%).  The current 
sample size provided adequate power to detect a moderate effect size (f
2
 = .15) at the p < .05 
level using a three group MANCOVA in g-power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).  A 
moderate effect size was expected based on previous studies that have produced effect sizes in 
this range when examining group differences in youth with different variants of CU traits on 
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measures of internalizing symptoms (Kahn et al., 2013) or negative emotionality (Kimonis et al., 
2012).   
Measures 
Inventory of Callous Unemotional Traits (ICU; Frick, 2004). The ICU is a 24 item self-
report scale designed to assess callous unemotional traits.  Derived from the Callous-
Unemotional scale of the Antisocial Process Screening Device (APSD; Frick & Hare, 2001), the 
ICU was developed to provide more items assessing CU traits to overcome low internal 
consistency of the items on the APSD (see, e.g., Loney, Frick, Clements, Ellis, & Kerlin, 2003).  
The ICU has three subscales (Callousness, Unemotional, and Uncaring) and a total score.  The 
current study utilized the total ICU score by summing all 24 items.  Items are rated on a four-
point scale ranging from 0 (“not at all true”) to 3 (“definitely true”).  The reliability and validity 
of the self-report version of the ICU has been supported in incarcerated (Kimonis et al., 2008) 
and community (Essau, Sasagawa, & Frick, 2006; Roose, Bijttebier, Decoene, Claes, & Frick, 
2010) samples of adolescents.  Specifically, past research has found that higher total scores, as 
well as the callousness and uncaring subscale scores of the ICU, are uniquely associated with 
increased aggression and delinquency (Kimonis, Frick, Munoz, & Aucoin, 2008; Kimonis et al., 
2008), even after controlling for other personality factors, such as extraversion and 
conscientiousness that are thought to be related to antisocial behavior (Essau et al., 2006).  In 
addition, past research in community samples of children and adolescents has found higher total 
scores on the ICU are significantly and negatively correlated with measures of both affective 
(Jones et al., 2010; Munoz, Qualter, & Padgett, 2011; Roose et al., 2010) and cognitive empathy 
(Munoz et al., 2011; Roose et al., 2010).  Further, the hypothesized variants in the current study 
have been found in a previous study of incarcerated adolescents using the ICU as a measure of 
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CU traits (Kimonis et al., 2008). The internal consistency in the current sample for the ICU total 
score was α = .72. 
The Revised Child Anxiety and Depression Scales (RCADS; Chorpita, Yim, Moffitt, 
Umemoto, & Francis, 2000).  The RCADS is an adaptation of the Spence Anxiety Scales 
(Spence, 1997) and consists of 47-items assessing symptoms of each anxiety disorder (except 
PTSD and Specific Phobias) and depression based on DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000).  Items were rated on a 4-point scale (i.e., "Never," "Sometimes," "Often," or 
"Always") corresponding to how frequently the symptom was experienced.  The current study 
used a total anxiety score that was obtained by summing all the relevant items assessing anxiety 
symptoms (37 items).  This total anxiety score has demonstrated good internal consistency (α 
= .95) in previous studies of children and adolescents (Daughters et al., 2009).  The RCADS has 
also demonstrated evidence of good cross-informant, convergent, and predictive validity among 
both community and clinic-referred samples.  For example, in a large sample of clinic-referred 
youth, ages 7 to 17, the RCADS demonstrated good convergent validity with other measures of 
anxiety (r‟s = .59 - .72; Chorpita, Moffitt, & Gray, 2005).  Further, in a community sample of 
parents and youth age 11 to 15, the RCADS demonstrated good cross-informant validity (r = .50) 
and total RCADS anxiety scores reported by youth were significantly associated with measures 
of behavioral inhibition (Muris, Meesters, & Spinder, 2003).  The internal consistency in the 
current sample for the total RCADS anxiety score was α = .95. 
Basic Empathy Scale (BES; Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006).  The BES is a 20-item self-
report inventory measuring cognitive (e.g., the ability to understand the emotions of another 
individual) and affective (e.g., the ability to experience the emotions of another individual) 
empathy.  In a community sample of adolescents, confirmatory factor analysis of the BES 
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supported a two-factor solution with item loadings ranging from 0.43 to 0.62 for the cognitive 
items and 0.41 and 0.71 for the affective items (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006).  The cognitive scale 
is composed of nine items (i.e., „when someone is feeling down I can usually understand how 
they feel‟) while the affective scale is composed of 11 items (i.e., „after being with a friend who 
is sad about something, I usually feel sad‟).  All items are rated on a five-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 („strongly disagree‟) to 5 („strongly agree‟).  There is a moderate correlation (r 
= .41) between the cognitive and affective scales (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006).  However, in 
support of their distinctiveness, Jolliffe and Farrington (2006) found that scores on the cognitive 
empathy scale demonstrated significant associations with a measure of extraversion (positive) 
and neuroticism (negative), while scores on the affective empathy scale were unrelated to 
extraversion and positively associated with neuroticism.  In past research, the BES demonstrated 
good internal consistency (α = .76 and α = .80) in adolescent populations for the cognitive and 
affective scale respectively (Sebastian et al., 2012b).  The internal consistency in the current 
sample was α = .78 and α = .60 for the affective and cognitive scales, respectively. 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999).  The WASI is a 
brief test of intellectual ability derived from the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children 
(WISC-III; Wechsler, 1991) and Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997) 
and was normed for individuals aged 6 to 89.  The current study utilized the two-subtest short 
form, which includes the Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning subtests to obtain a Full Scale IQ 
estimate (FSIQ).  The Vocabulary subtest consists of 42 items in which individuals give oral 
definitions of four images and 37 words that are presented both orally and visually.  The Matrix 
Reasoning subtest consists of 35 incomplete grid patterns; individuals choose the correct 
response from five possible choices.  The Full Scale IQ for the two-subtest form is highly 
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correlated with the Full Scale IQ on both the WISC-III (r = .81) and WAIS-III (r = .87; Wechsler, 
1999).  In the current sample, four youth declined to complete the IQ testing but were still 
included in the analyses.  
Emotional Pictures Dot-Probe Task (Kimonis, Frick, Fazekas, & Loney, 2006; Kimonis, 
Frick, Marsee, & Aucoin, 2008).  The emotional pictures dot-probe task is a spatially oriented 
attention task designed to measure attentional bias towards emotional cues and serves as an index 
of emotional reactivity (Schippell, Vasey, Cravens-Brown, & Bretveld, 2003).  The task is 
computer administered and, for the most part, uses slides taken from the International Affective 
Picture System (IAPS).  The slides used for the task were selected to represent distress in others 
(e.g., crying child), positive emotional content (e.g., puppies), and neutral emotional content (e.g., 
a fork).  In order to have enough slides for the three categories of neutral, distress, and positive, 
additional neutral (n = 42) and distress (n = 19) slides matching the IAPS slide content were 
added.  For example, additional slides of crying children were added to the existing IAPS slides 
of crying children.   
The task contains a practice trial of 16 picture pairs, which is followed by four 
experiment blocks with each block containing 24 picture pairs.  Every picture pair presentation 
contains three components that appear sequentially.  First, a 500 millisecond fixation cross 
appears in the center of the screen.  The second component consists of a 250-millisecond 
presentation of two picture stimuli that are centered and appear directly above and below the 
fixation cross.  Finally, the last component is an asterisk (i.e., dot probe) that appears at either the 
location of the top or bottom picture previously presented.  The participant was asked to select a 
key on the keyboard corresponding to the correct location of the dot-probe (i.e., top or bottom) as 
quickly as possible.  The dot followed picture pairs, which included three combinations of 
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emotional content: neutral-neutral, distress-neutral, and positive-neutral.  The location and type 
of picture stimuli were counterbalanced across all trials so that equal numbers of emotional and 
neutral stimuli appeared in both the top and bottom locations.  
The time between the onset of the dot-probe and when the participant presses a key is 
recorded in milliseconds.  An attentional facilitation index can be calculated for each different 
category of emotional valence (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988).  For example, the facilitation index 
for distress = ½ [(neutral only/probe top – distress up/probe top) + (neutral only/probe bottom – 
distress down/probe bottom)].  Specifically, the participant‟s average response time to probes 
replacing distress stimuli is subtracted from their average response time to probes replacing 
neutral stimuli.  The facilitation index controls for location effects (a participant‟s tendency to 
attend to either the top or bottom of a screen) by adding latency for responses to top and bottom 
picture locations and taking an average.  The dot probe task assumes the participant‟s response 
will be faster if their attention is allocated towards and corresponds with the spatial location of 
the probe.  Thus, higher scores indicate greater attentional orienting to the emotional stimuli.  For 
the purposes of the current study, only the facilitation index to distress pictures was used.   
Consistent with previous studies utilizing this paradigm (e.g., Kimonis et al., 2012), if the 
participant did not respond to a dot probe stimuli within 5000 ms, that response was recorded as 
incorrect and those responses were not included in calculating the facilitation index to distress 
for the current study.  Also consistent with previous studies (e.g., Kimonis et al., 2012), 
participants whose facilitation scores differed from the mean by more than three standard 
deviations were eliminated from the current analyses.  In the current study, facilitation scores for 
n = 8 youth were not included due to a combination of these exclusion factors.    
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Past research among incarcerated adolescents has shown that low levels of facilitation to 
distress in CU youth are associated with higher levels of proactive and reactive aggression as 
well as violent delinquency (Kimonis et al., 2008).  More importantly, when examining variants 
of psychopathy in adolescent offenders, this dot probe task differentiated primary variants from 
secondary variants, with the primary variant showing lower levels of facilitation to distress 
(Kimonis et al. 2012).  Further, in samples of incarcerated adolescents, the facilitation index to 
distress has demonstrated adequate internal consistency (α =.80 - .81; Kimonis et al., 2008; 
Kimonis et al., 2012).  In the current study, the internal consistency of response times across the 
distress pictures was α = .90. 
NimStim Affective Facial Recognition Task (Tottenham et al. 2009).  In the current study, 
affect recognition was measured using facial stimuli taken from the NimStim set of facial 
expressions (Tottenham et al. 2009).  This set of facial stimuli contain color photographs of 
adults, both male and female varying in ethnic composition, and depict frontal images of 
emotional expressions.  Each expression also has separate open and closed mouth versions.  The 
design of the current task was modeled after the University of New South Wales Facial Emotion 
Task (FACES; Dadds, Hawes, & Merz, 2004).  Specifically, facial expressions of happiness, 
sadness, anger, disgust, fear, or neutral expressions are displayed by six adult faces (for a total of 
36 different stimuli).  The adult actors in the NimStim set of facial expressions chosen for this 
task varied in ethnic composition (3 Caucasian, 1 African American, 1 Hispanic, and 1 Asian) as 
well as gender (3 female and 3 male).  In addition, for each facial expression, we varied open and 
closed mouth expressions, so that each facial expression was presented three times as „open 
mouthed‟ and three times as „closed mouthed‟ within the task.  This was done in order to control 
for potential perceptual differences between facial stimuli (e.g., tooth visual) since this type of 
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difference in facial feature may bias responses (Kestenbaum & Nelson, 1990).  Facial stimuli 
were presented in a random order for 2 seconds each.  After each individual facial stimulus, a 
screen appeared instructing the participant to select which emotion was portrayed from a list of 
all six emotions.  Participants were given a practice run of six trials (one of each emotion) prior 
to beginning the experiment.   
Validation of the entire set of facial stimuli was conducted with adult undergraduate and 
community samples (Tottenham et al., 2009).  Validity was measured by examining the 
concordance between participant‟s labels or responses and the facial expression intended to be 
presented.  The overall concordance was high (mean kappa = .79; Tottenham, et al., 2009).  
Reliability scores were measured by having participants label the same facial expressions 
(presented randomly each time) on two separate trials.  The proportion of agreement across the 
two trials for participants was adequate (mean reliability score of .84, SD = .08; Tottenham et al., 
2009).  Past research in samples of clinic-referred (Leist & Dadds, 2009) and community (Dadds 
et al., 2006) children and adolescents has shown that affect recognition (using the FACES task) 
differs between control groups and youth with high levels of CU traits.  Specifically, youth with 
high levels of CU traits had poorer recognition of fearful faces compared to those without CU 
traits (Dadds et al., 2006; Leist & Dadds, 2009).  
In the current sample, differences in accuracy between open and closed mouth 
expressions were tested using a series of mixed multivariate analysis of covariance 
(MANCOVA) with open and closed mouth accuracy as a within groups independent variable 
(controlling for age and IQ).  Results revealed no differences in accuracy rates for open and 
closed mouthed expressions for both individual facial expression accuracy and total facial 
accuracy (range p = .50 to .93).  Thus, total accuracy for each of the six expressions and a total 
22 
 
facial accuracy score were calculated using both open and closed mouthed expressions.  In the 
current sample, accuracy rates ranged from 52% - 84% for fearful expressions; 73% to 80% for 
disgust expressions; 30% to 87% for angry expressions; 71% to 90% for neutral expressions; and 
87% to 94% for happy expressions.  The accuracy rate was 9% to 94% for sad expressions.  Thus, 
one facial stimulus depicting sadness was particularly low (9%) and was removed from the sad 
accuracy total as well as the facial accuracy total score, leaving the range of sadness accuracy at 
52% to 94%.  Accuracy scores for the total and six individual facial expressions were eliminated 
from analyses if the score differed from the mean by more than three standard deviations.  This 
resulted in the following number of participant scores being excluded from the current analysis: 
happy expressions (n = 4), angry expression (n = 2), fearful expressions (n = 1), disgust 
expressions (n = 3), sad expressions (n = 5), neutral expressions (n = 3), and total accuracy (n = 
5).  One youth did not complete this task in the current study. 
Affective and Cognitive Theory of Mind Task (Hynes, Baird, & Grafton, 2006).  This task 
measured the participant‟s ability to make inferences about another‟s mental state.  Participants 
were provided with written scenarios or stories that are designed to assess both cognitive and 
affective ToM.  Additional written scenarios formed a „physical‟ condition that served as a 
control.  Each condition contained 14 scenarios and each scenario was followed by a multiple 
choice question.  All of the scenarios were presented visually on the computer for the participant 
to read at their own pace; scenarios did not differ in word length (Hynes et al., 2006).  
Participants were then presented with a question about the scenario, which remained on the 
screen for 7 seconds to allow them to time to consider an answer.  The question remained on the 
screen while three answer options were presented for the participant to choose from.  
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The scenarios consisted of everyday situations.  In the cognitive condition, participants 
were asked to make a cognitive attribution to a character (e.g., „Why did the burglar give himself 
up?‟) and in the affective conditions, participants were asked to make an emotional attribution to 
a character (e.g., „How does Ruth feel?‟).  The physical scenarios asked the participant about 
physical details in the story (e.g., „why does Paul pay in installments?‟).  The cognitive and 
physical scenarios in this task were originally taken from the Strange Stories Task (Happe, 1994).  
The affective scenarios were developed and used with the existing cognitive and physical 
scenarios by Hynes and colleagues (2006).  To minimize the amount of carry-over effects, 
scenarios were grouped into two runs containing seven questions from each condition type (21 
scenarios per run), and presented in the following order for each run: physical control scenarios 
(7), cognitive scenarios (7), and emotional scenarios (7).  In past research, performance on the 
Strange Stories Task has differentiated adults with an Autism diagnosis from healthy control 
adults and children as well as a group of adults who were intellectually impaired (Happe, 1994).  
Specifically, adults with Autism made more errors than the other two groups (Happe, 1994).  
Performance on the Strange Stories Task has also differentiated children and adolescents with an 
Asperger diagnosis from a control group of children and adolescents with no diagnosis, in that 
those with an Asperger diagnosis scored significantly lower than the control group (Kaland et al., 
2005).  In the current study, accuracy for individual scenarios in the first run ranged from 31% to 
95% (cognitive) and 76 to 91% (emotional).  In the second block, accuracy on individual 
scenarios ranged from 60 to 83% for the cognitive scenarios and 22 to 83% for emotional 
scenarios.  A mixed MANCOVA (controlling for age and IQ) using the error rate from the two 
runs as a within group independent variable revealed a trend for a deterioration in performance 
from the first block to the second block of this task (multivariate F (3, 91) = 2.60, p = .058). 
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Therefore, only data from the first run were included in the current study.  Participants whose 
scores differed from the mean by more than three standard deviations were eliminated from the 
current analyses (cognitive ToM, n = 1; emotional ToM, n = 2).  An additional three youth did 
not complete this task in the current study.  
Record Review Forms.  Background information was extracted from the institutional files 
of each participant.  The Record Review form consisted of items measuring basic demographic 
information, criminal history data, psychoeducational testing results, and mental health variables.  
Age, ethnicity, and days in the detention facility were coded from the institutional files for 
purposes of the current study.  For the current sample, the average number of days spent in the 
detention facility was 13.94 (SD = 10.70).  Due to the low base rate of the other racial/ethnic 
groups (e.g., Hispanic, Other), participants were dichotomized into two groups: Non African 
American = 0 and African American = 1.  
Procedures 
Institutional Review Board approval for the study procedures was obtained prior to the 
onset of data collection.  In order to obtain parental consent, a telephone informed consent 
procedure was conducted with the parents of participants.  Audiotape served as the record of 
consent for the researchers.  Hard copies of all consent forms were also mailed to parents.  Youth 
assent took place in person either individually or within small groups at the detention facility.  
After obtaining parental consent and youth assent, the data collection took place in two sessions.  
For the first session, paper and pencil questionnaires (i.e., ICU and RCADS) were administered 
to the participants during either a small group session (approximately 4 participants per group) or 
individually, depending upon the regulations of the facility.  During the second session, 
participants met individually with the researcher and completed an intelligence assessment (i.e., 
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WASI) as well as the four primary study tasks on the computer (i.e., Emotional Pictures Dot-
Probe Task, Basic Empathy Scale, NimStim Affective Facial Recognition Task, and the 
Affective and Cognitive ToM Task).  Both sessions took take place in a private room at the 
detention facility and together both sessions typically lasted three hours.  Participants received 
snacks as a thank you for participating after each portion of the study.  Youth were reminded that 
the information they provide would remain confidential except when specified by the consent 
process (i.e., evidence of abuse, and intention to harm others or self).  Youth were also told that 
their participation in the research would have no effect on their length of stay at the detention 
facility nor would it have an effect on their court proceedings. 
Data Analytic Plan  
In order to reduce the influence of outliers in the independent variables, a winsorization 
scheme was used to modify any outlying data points (defined as 2 SD above and below the 
mean) for both ICU total score and the RCADS Anxiety total score by changing their values to 
the next most extreme, non-outlying value in the distribution.  This procedure maintains a values‟ 
position in the distribution and ensures any mean differences observed are not driven by scores 
in the tail of the distribution (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).  This resulted in the change of four 
data points for the ICU total score and five data points for the RCADS Anxiety total score.  
Next, using Mplus (Muthen & Muthen, 2008), Latent profile analysis (LPA; Lazarfeld & 
Henry, 1968) was conducted to test whether distinct groups emerge that differ on their level of 
CU traits and anxiety.  LPA is a person-centered, model-based cluster procedure, which is a type 
of latent variable mixture modeling used with continuous variables.  LPA is considered superior 
to traditional clustering analysis because it allows for a more flexible model specification and 
provides several goodness-of-fit indices to aid in selecting the optimal number of groups (Pastor, 
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Barron, Miller, & Davis, 2007; Vermunt & Magidson, 2002).  In the current study, LPA analysis 
using full information maximum likelihood (FIML; Schafer & Graham, 2002) was performed to 
classify the participants on two variables: CU traits and anxiety symptoms.  A series of models 
with increasing numbers of groups or classes was run and the best fitting model was chosen 
based on a combination of the following methods: comparing tests of statistical significance, 
goodness of fit indices, and interpretability of the profiles (see Flaherty & Kiff, 2012).  Selection 
of the best fitting model was also based on sizes of groups within models.  Specifically, solutions 
that contained groups with less than 5% of the cases were examined with caution. 
To compare the models on a test of statistical significance, the Lo-Mendell-Rubin (LMR; 
Lo, Mendell, Rubin, 2001) likelihood ratio test was examined.  The LMR is a method that tests 
the fit of a model with K groups against one with K-1 groups (Muthen, 2003).  The LMR 
determines whether the fit of a specific model (K) is better than one that is more parsimonious 
(K-1).  Specifically, when estimating the fit of a model with K groups, the LMR tests the null 
hypothesis that the data are better fit by a model of K-1 groups.  A low p-value on the LMR 
index indicates better model fit for at least K groups and supports the rejection of the K-1 model 
(Muthen, 2003).  Model fit was also compared by examining goodness of fit using information 
criterion indexes.  Specifically, the Baysian Information Criterion (BIC; Schwartz, 1978; Raftery, 
1986) as well as the sample size adjusted BIC (SSA-BIC; Yang, 2006) were examined.  Next, 
the Akaike‟s Information Criteria (AIC; Akaike, 1973, 1974) was also examined.  For all three of 
these information criteria indices, a decrease in value is indicative of a better fitting model.  That 
is, a model with a lower BIC, AIC, or SSA-BIC value is indicative of a better fit than a model 
with higher values on these indices.  Finally, the entropy value was examined, which is a 
measure of classification uncertainty.  In Mplus the entropy value is rescaled and reported as the 
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„relative entropy‟.  The relative entropy value ranges from zero to one with values near one 
indicating high certainty in classification and values closer to zero indicating low certainty in 
classification.  
A series of ANOVAs or chi-square tests were conducted to determine if the groups 
obtained from the LPA analysis differed on important demographic variables (i.e., age, ethnicity, 
IQ, and days spent in detention facility).  Although the groups did not differ on any of these 
variables, IQ was still used as a covariate in all analyses because of the goal of determining 
group differences on the measures of cognitive empathy after controlling for general intelligence.  
Assuming that the corresponding measures of empathy (cognitive or affective) were correlated 
with one another, a series of MANCOVAs, controlling for IQ, were planned to test whether the 
primary and secondary variant differed on measures of affective and cognitive empathy.  
However, because the measures of affective empathy (BES self-report of affective empathy and 
Emotional Pictures Dot-Probe Task) were uncorrelated with each other (r = .10, p = .35), group 
differences were tested for these measures in individual ANCOVAs.  In contrast, because the 
measures of cognitive empathy were significantly intercorrelated, a MANCOVA was conducted 
to test whether groups differed on tasks measuring cognitive empathy (BES self-report cognitive 
empathy, NimStim Affective Facial Recognition Task, Affective and Cognitive ToM tasks) after 
controlling for IQ.  Significant MANCOVAs was followed by individual ANOVAs to determine 
which individual variables differed across groups and pairwise comparisons were used to 
determine differences between groups on the individual variables.  
Finally, due to the very small group of youth showing the secondary variant identified in 
the LPA analyses, all hypotheses were also tested using CU traits and anxiety as continuous 
variables (again using the winsorized versions described above) in hierarchical regressions and 
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testing for interaction effects between CU traits and anxiety on all measures of affective and 
cognitive empathy.  Specifically, IQ was entered into the first step, sample mean-centered 
variables for CU traits and Anxiety were entered in the second step, and the multiplicative 
interaction term composed from centered variables for CU traits and Anxiety was entered in the 
third step.  The amount of incremental variance accounted for at each successive step was tested 
for significance and any significant interaction was explored using the procedure recommended 
by Holmbeck (2002).  In this procedure, the regression equation from the full sample is used to 
calculate predicted values of the dependent variable at both high (one SD above the mean) and 
low (one SD below the mean) levels of the predictors (CU traits and Anxiety).  Further, the 
significance of the simple slopes testing the significance of the association of one predictor with 
the dependent variable at the different levels of the other predictor were also conducted.    
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for all main study variables are presented in Table 1.  In addition, 
results of correlation analyses between all main study variables are presented in Table 2.  Total 
ICU score was significantly negatively correlated with both self-report measures of cognitive (r 
= -.29, p < .01) and affective (r = -.34, p < .001) empathy as well as significantly positively 
correlated with number of days spent in detention (r = .22, p < .05).  RCADS Anxiety total was 
significantly positively associated with self-reported affective empathy (r = .34, p < .001) and 
significantly negatively associated with affective ToM (r = -.22, p < .05).  IQ was significantly 
associated with all measures of cognitive empathy (r’s ranging from .20 to .36). 
Latent Profile Analysis 
Profile Selection.  Using Mplus (Muthen & Muthen, 2008), latent profile analysis (LPA; 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics of Main Study Variables 
Note.  WASI IQ = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence – Intelligence quotient; ICU =  
Inventory of Callous Unemotional Traits; RCADS = Revised Child Anxiety and Depression Scale;  
BES = Basic Empathy Scale; ToM = Theory of Mind.   
 
Lazarfeld & Henry, 1968) was conducted in order to classify participants on the following two  
variables: the total score from the ICU (Frick, 2004) and the total Anxiety score from the 
RCADS (Chorpita, et al., 2000).  The results of the LPA analysis were not consistent with our 
hypothesis for a three class model, but instead a five class model appeared to fit the data best 
based on a combination of methods.  Specifically, when looking at the methods for comparing 
the groups (see Table 3), the LMR test was only significant for the two class model, indicating 
the two class model was a better fit than a one class model for this sample.  The AIC, BIC, and 
the SSA-BIC all showed modest increases as the class size went from two to three and then from 
three to four classes.  Consistent with the increase in these indices the entropy value decreased 
from 0.81 to .70 as class size changed from two to three classes, and then to .71 as the class size 
changed from three to four classes.  However, when comparing the four class model to the five 
class model, there was a decrease, albeit modest, in the AIC value and the SSA-BIC indicative of 
a better fitting model.  In addition, the entropy value increased to 0.79 in the five class model. 
Finally, when comparing the five class model to a six class model, there was a modest increase 
Measure Mean / % SD / N Range 
Age 15.50 1.30 8 
Ethnicity (% African American) 79% 85 - 
WASI IQ 82.19 8.33 38 
Total Days Institutionalized 13.94 10.65 54 
ICU Total 28.50 7.72 33 
RCADS Anxiety Total 27.04 16.70 63 
Dot Probe – Facilitation Index -9.63 39.36 232.33 
BES – Affective Empathy 30.10 6.94 37 
BES – Cognitive Empathy 32.11 4.58 26 
NimStim Affective Facial Recognition Task 28.52 4.58 23 
Affective  ToM 6.18 1.08 4 
Cognitive  ToM 5.42 1.06 4 
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in AIC and BIC values, and a small decrease (2.24) in the SSA-BIC value.  The entropy value 
increased to .84 in the six class model indicating a better model fit; however, the size of class 4 
in this model was very small (n = 4) and constituted less than 5% of the sample.  Thus, this 
model was eliminated from further comparison.  Across all models, the posterior probabilities for 
class membership were relatively high ranging from .80 to .95 (See Table 4).  Ultimately, the 
five class model was selected over the two class model because the resulting classes allowed for 
interpretations that were consistent with the theoretical viewpoint set forth in our hypotheses.  
The five class model also produced similar values in SSA-BIC and entropy levels compared to 
the two class model...  As an additional step, the first (n = 12) and fourth class (n = 41) within 
this five class model was merged into one class.  This was due to the fact that both of these 
groups presented with low scores on both CU traits and anxiety that made them largely 
indistinguishable for the purposes of group comparisons in the current study.  
Thus, the final model consisted of 4 groups (see Table 5).  The first group (n = 53) was 
labeled “Low CU / Low Anx” because it showed significantly lower scores on CU traits (M = 
24.50, SD = 5.43) than the second group (M = 36.33, SD = 3.60) and the fourth group (M = 36.10,  
SD = 3.70) but did not differ from the third group (M = 21.43, SD = 4.89).  This group also had 
significantly lower scores on Anxiety (M = 23.54, SD = 8.93) than both the third (M = 53.64, SD 
= 6.61) and fourth (M = 50.80, SD = 9.16) groups but had significantly higher scores than the 
second group (M = 12.90, SD = 8.04).  The second group (n = 30) labeled “primary”, scored 
significantly higher on CU traits (M = 36.33, SD = 3.60) than the Low CU / Low Anx and the 
third group but did not differ from the fourth group.  The primary variant also had significantly 
lower anxiety scores (M = 12.90, SD = 8.04) than all other three groups.  The third group, labeled 
“Low CU / High Anx” (n = 14), scored significantly lower on CU traits (M = 21.43, SD = 4.89) 
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Table 2.  Zero-order Correlations of Main Study Variables 
Note.  *** = p < .001, ** = p < .01, * = p < .05, 
†
 = p < .08.  WASI IQ = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence – Intelligence quotient; ICU = 
Inventory of Callous Unemotional Traits; RCADS = Revised Child Anxiety and Depression Scale; BES = Basic Empathy Scale; ToM = Theory of 
Mind.   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Age            
2. Ethnicity (African American)   .05           
3. WASI IQ -.10 -.28**          
4. Total Days Institutionalized  .05  .15 -.12         
5. ICU Total -.05  .07 -.03  .22*        
6. RCADS Anxiety Total  .10  .01 -.08 -.19
†
 -.17
†
       
7. Dot Probe Facilitation Index  .15  .01 -.07 -.09 -.09 -.16      
8. BES Affective Empathy  .05 -.20* -.11 -.10 -.34*** .34***  .10     
9. BES Cognitive Empathy  .17
†
 -.05  .23* -.13 -.29**  .16 -.10 -.01    
10. NimStim Facial Task  .14 -.16  .28**  .09  .00 -.10 -.27** -.17 .36***   
11. Affective ToM  .06 -.12  .20*  .16  .13 -.22* -.09 -.31**  .17 .34**  
12. Cognitive ToM -.01 -.17  .36***  .14  .06 -.10  .05 -.15  .18 .32** .39*** 
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Table 3.  Fit Statistics for Latent Profile Models 
 
Statistic 
Model AIC BIC SSA-BIC LMR Entropy 
2 Class 560.75 579.46 557.34 19.46*** 0.81 
3 Class 563.30 590.03 558.43 3.23 0.71 
4 Class 566.32 601.07 559.99 2.78 0.70 
5 Class 564.53 607.29 556.74 7.27 0.79 
6 Class 563.75 614.53 554.50 6.32 0.84 
Note.  *** = p < .001.  AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; SAA-
BIC = Sample size Adjusted BIC; LMR = Lo-Mendell-Rubin likelihood ratio test.  
 
 
Table 4.  Posterior Probabilities for Latent Profiles 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 Class 6 
Model       
2 Class       
Class 1 (n = 24) .94 .06     
Class 2 (n = 83) .05 .95     
3 Class       
Class 1 (n = 55) .86 .00 .14    
Class 2 (n = 22) .00 .93 .07    
Class 3 (n = 30) .13 .04 .83    
4 Class       
Class 1 (n = 10) .85 .03 .04 .09   
Class 2 (n = 49) .03 .83 .12 .02   
Class 3 (n = 33) .02 .14 .85 .00   
Class 4 (n = 15) .01 .06 .00 .85   
5 Class       
Class 1 (n = 12) .80 .00 .00 .15 .05  
Class 2 (n = 30) .00 .88 .01 .11 .00  
Class 3 (n = 10) .00 .03 .87 .07 .04  
Class 4 (n = 41) .03 .06 .01 .87 .02  
Class 5 (n = 14) .00 .00 .02 .04 .93  
6 Class       
Class 1 (n = 41) .89 .03 .03 .00 .03 .01 
Class 2 (n = 30) .09 .89 .00 .00 .00 .02 
Class 3 (n = 13) .04 .00 .87 .04 .00 .04 
Class 4 (n = 4) .00 .00 .02 .93 .06 .00 
Class 5 (n = 11) .07 .00 .00 .01 .92 .00 
Class 6 (n = 8) .00 .05 .00 .00 .00 .95 
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Table 5.  Profile Variable Means and Standard Deviations 
Note.  *** = p < .001.  Means with different superscripts differ significantly in pairwise comparisons.  CU 
= callous-unemotional; Anx = Anxiety; ICU = Inventory of Callous Unemotional Traits; RCADS = 
Revised Child Anxiety and Depression Scale.   
 
 
than the primary and fourth group but did not differ from the Low CU / Low Anx group.  In 
addition, the Low CU / High Anx group scored significantly higher on anxiety (M = 53.64, SD = 
6.61) than the Low CU / Low Anx group and the primary variant.  Finally, a small fourth group 
(n = 10), labeled “secondary” scored significantly higher on CU traits than the Low CU / Low 
Anx and Low CU / High Anx group, but did not differ from the primary variant.  Further, the 
secondary variant scored significantly higher on anxiety than both the primary and Low CU / 
Low Anx group.   
Next, the four groups were compared on the potential confounding variables of age, IQ, 
and days in detention using a series of ANOVAs.  No significant differences between groups 
were found on age (F (3, 103) = 1.36, p = .26, ηp
2
 = .04), IQ (F (3, 99) = 1.32, p = .27, ηp
2 
= .04), 
or days in detention (F (3, 99) = 2.57, p = .06, ηp
2
 = .07).  A chi square analysis comparing the 
four groups on ethnicity was also non-significant (χ2 (3) = 1.24, p = .74), φ = .11.  
Comparison of Groups on Measures of Affective and Cognitive Empathy 
As noted previously, given that the two measures of affective empathy were not 
significantly correlated with one another (r = .10, p = .35), two separate ANCOVAs  
 Low CU / 
Low Anx 
(n = 53) 
Primary 
(n = 30) 
Low CU / 
High Anx 
(n = 14) 
Secondary 
(n = 10) 
Test Statistic Effect Size 
CU Traits       
ICU Total       
 24.50 (5.43)
a 
36.33 (3.60)
b 
21.43(4.89)
a 
36.10 (3.70)
b 
F (3, 103) = 58.14*** p
2
 = .63 
Anxiety       
RCADS 
Anxiety Total 
      
 23.54 (8.93)
a 
12.90 (8.04)
b 
53.64 (6.61)
c 
50.80 (9.16)
c 
F (3, 103) = 103.80*** p
2
 = .75 
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Table 6.  Profile Differences in Affective Empathy Measures 
Note.  ** = p < .01.  All analyses used the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence – Intelligence 
quotient (WASI IQ; Wechsler, 1999) as a covariate.  Rates with different superscripts differ significantly  
in pairwise comparisons.  CU = callous-unemotional; Anx = Anxiety; BES = Basic Empathy Scale.  
 
 
(controlling for IQ) were conducted with the affective empathy measures as the dependent 
variables and using the four groups identified in the LPA (see Table 6).  For the facilitation index 
to distress, the overall ANCOVA was not significant (F (3, 90) = 1.82, p = .15, ηp
2 
= .06).  
However, consistent with hypotheses, the overall ANCOVA for the BES self-report affective 
empathy scale was significant (F (3, 98) = 3.89, p = .01, ηp
2
 = .11).  Post hoc pairwise 
comparisons revealed that the primary variant scored the lowest on affective empathy (M = 27.25, 
SD = 6.48) and differed significantly from both the Low CU / Low Anx (M = 30.61, SD = 5.98) 
and Low CU / High Anx group (M = 34.21, SD = 8.32).  Contrary to hypotheses, the primary 
variant did not differ significantly from the secondary variant (M = 31.76, SD = 6.17) on self-
report affective empathy, although there was a trend (p = .07) in this direction.   
Next, a MANCOVA (controlling for IQ) was conducted comparing groups on measures 
of cognitive empathy (BES self-report cognitive empathy, NimStim Affective Facial 
Recognition Task, and Affective and Cognitive ToM tasks).  As noted in Table 7, the overall 
MANCOVA was significant (multivariate F (12, 225) = 3.62, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .14).  Follow up  
 Low CU /  
Low Anx 
 
Primary 
 
Low CU /  
High Anx 
 
Secondary 
 
Test Statistic Effect Size 
 (n = 48) (n = 26) (n = 13) (n = 8)   
Dot Probe 
Facilitation 
Index  
      
 -9.69 (39.88)
 
-4.49 (32.82)
 
-5.53 (38.89)
 
-40.55 (53.47)
 
F (3, 90) = 1.82 p
2
 = .06 
 (n = 52) (n = 27) (n = 14) (n = 10)   
BES  
Affective 
Empathy  
      
 30.60 (5.98)
a 
27.25 (6.48)
b 
34.24 (8.32)
a 
31.75 (6.17)
ab 
F (3, 98) = 3.89** p
2 
= .11 
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Table 7.  Multivariate Analyses of Covariance for Measures of Cognitive Empathy 
 Low CU / Low Anx 
 
Primary 
 
Low CU / High Anx 
 
Secondary 
 
Variable (n = 49) (n = 23) (n = 13) (n = 8) 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Measures of Cognitive Empathy 
BES Cognitive Empathy 
32.21
a 
3.47 31.24
ac 
3.36 37.24
b 
4.48 29.74
c 
5.18 
NimStim Affective Facial 
Task 
28.36
 
4.98
 
29.27
 
3.82 30.13
 
1.92 26.34
 
6.82 
Affective ToM  
6.15
a 
1.11 6.52
a 
0.85 5.90
ab 
1.26 5.36
b 
1.04 
Cognitive ToM  
5.19
a 
1.00 5.86
b 
1.01 5.66
b 
0.95 5.08
a 
1.36 
Note.  Effects are based on a multivariate analysis of covariance using Wilks‟ λ.  All analyses used the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
– Intelligence quotient (WASI IQ; Wechsler, 1999) as a covariate.  Means reported in the table are least-squared means adjusted for the covariates.  
Means with different subscripts differ at the p < .05 level in pairwise comparisons.  Multivariate F (12, 225) = 3.62, p < .001, p
2
 = .14; BES 
Cognitive Univariate F (3, 88) = 9.42, p < .001, p
2
 = .24; NimStim Affective Facial Task Accuracy Univariate F (3, 88) = 1.36, p = .26, p
2
 = .04; 
ToM Affective Univariate F (3, 88) = 2.63, p = .05, p
2
 = .08; ToM Cognitive Univariate F (3, 88) = 3.10, p < .05, p
2
 = .10.  
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ANCOVAs revealed a significant difference between groups on BES self-report cognitive 
empathy (univariate F (3, 88) = 9.42, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .24), affective ToM (univariate F (3, 88) = 
2.63, p = .05. ηp
2
 = .08) and cognitive ToM (univariate F (3, 88) = 3.10, p < .05, ηp
2
 = .10).  The 
follow up ANCOVA for the NimStim affective facial recognition task was not significant (F (3, 
88) = 1.36, p = .26, ηp
2
 = .04).  
For self-report cognitive empathy, post hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that, 
consistent with hypotheses, the secondary variant scored the lowest on cognitive empathy (M = 
29.74, SD = 5.18); however, this was only significantly different from the Low CU/ Low Anx (M 
= 32.21, SD = 3.47) and the Low CU / High Anx (M = 37.24, SD = 4.48) groups.  Contrary to 
hypotheses, the secondary variant did not score significantly lower than the primary variant (M = 
31.24, SD = 3.36) on self-report cognitive empathy.  For affective ToM, posthoc pairwise 
comparisons were consistent with hypotheses showing the secondary variant (M = 5.36, SD = 
1.04) scored significantly lower than primary variant (M = 6.52, SD = 0.85).  The secondary 
variant also scored significantly lower than the Low CU / Low Anx group (M = 6.15, SD = 1.11) 
but did not differ from the Low CU / High Anx group (M = 5.90, SD = 1.26).  Finally, for 
cognitive ToM, post hoc pairwise comparisons were also consistent with hypotheses showing 
that the secondary variant (M = 5.08, SD = 1.36) scored significantly lower than the primary 
variant (M = 5.86, SD = 1.01) as well as the Low CU / Low High Anx group (M = 5.66, SD = 
0.95), but did not differ from the Low CU / Low Anx group (M = 5.19, SD = 1.00).  
To examine whether there were any significant differences between groups on accuracy 
for specific facial expressions on the NimStim affective facial recognition task, a MANCOVA 
(controlling for IQ) was conducted comparing groups on accuracy for all six facial expressions 
(happy, angry, fearful, disgust, neutral, and sad).  As noted in Table 8, the overall MANCOVA  
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Table 8.  Multivariate Analyses of Covariance for NimStim Affective Facial Task  
 Low CU / Low Anx 
 
Primary 
 
Low CU / High Anx 
 
Secondary 
 
Variable (n = 47) (n = 24) (n = 13) (n = 7) 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
NimStim Affective Facial Accuracy 
  Happy Accuracy 5.74 0.44 5.88 0.34 5.92 0.00 6.01 0.28 
  Angry Accuracy 4.22 1.07 4.38 1.24 4.60 1.12 4.95 0.90 
  Fearful Accuracy 4.56 1.60 5.21 1.02 4.44 1.20 4.67 1.90 
  Disgust Accuracy 5.40
a 
1.06 4.84
a 
1.49 5.69
a 
0.48 4.04
b 
1.63 
  Neutral Accuracy 5.24 1.01 5.25 1.03 5.60 0.51 5.25 1.07 
  Sad Accuracy 4.00 0.91 3.96 0.81 3.93 0.64 4.13 1.21 
Note.  Effects are based on a multivariate analysis of covariance using Wilks‟ λ.  All analyses used the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
– Intelligence quotient (WASI IQ; Wechsler, 1999) as a covariate.  Means reported in the table reflect number of correct identifications and least-
squared means adjusted for the covariates.  Means with different subscripts differ at the p < .05 level in pairwise comparisons.  The n‟s in the table 
reflect the group sizes for the multivariate analysis and different group sizes for individual univariate tests are listed below.  Multivariate F (18, 
230) = 1.48, p = .10, p
2
 = .10; Happy Accuracy Univariate F (3, 94) = 1.23, p = .30, p
2
 = .04, (n = 99); Angry Accuracy Univariate F (3, 96) = 
0.67, p = .57, p
2
 = .02, (n = 101); Fearful Accuracy Univariate F (3, 97) = 1.59, p = .20, p
2
 = .05, (n = 102); Disgust Accuracy Univariate F (3, 
95) = 4.70, p < .01, p
2
 = .13, (n = 100); Neutral Accuracy Univariate F (3, 95) = 1.48, p = .23, p
2
 = .05, (n = 100); Sad Accuracy Univariate F (3, 
93) = 0.83, p = .97, p
2
 = .003, (n = 98). 
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was not significant (Multivariate F (18, 230) = 1.48, p = .10, ηp
2
 = .10).  Follow-up individual 
ANCOVAs were also conducted separately for accuracy on all six facial expressions given that 
not all of the facial accuracy scores for the six expressions were correlated with one another (r’s 
ranging from .01 to .32).  However, these analyses should be interpreted cautiously, given the 
lack of significant effects in the MANCOVA.  Disgust recognition accuracy was the only 
emotional recognition measure that differed significantly between groups (F (3, 95) = 4.70, p 
= .01, ηp
2
 = .13).  Post hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that the secondary variant scored 
significantly lower (M = 4.04, SD = 1.63) on disgust recognition accuracy compared to all three 
groups [primary variant (M = 4.84, SD = 1.49); Low CU / Low Anx (M = 5.40, SD = 1.06); Low 
CU / High Anx (M = 5.69, SD = 0.48)].  
Hierarchical Regression Analyses 
With the exception of the analysis using the emotional pictures dot-probe task, the results 
of the group comparisons were generally in the expected direction, with the primary variant 
showing the lowest levels of affective empathy and the secondary variant showing lower levels 
of cognitive empathy.  However, many of the pairwise comparisons did not reach statistical 
significance, possibly due to the relatively small number of youth who fell into this group (n = 
10).  Thus, a series of hierarchical regressions (controlling for IQ) were conducted testing the 
interaction between CU traits and Anxiety for predicting measures of affective and cognitive 
empathy.  
The results of these analyses for the affective empathy variables are reported in Table 9.  
For the facilitation index to distress there was a trend for a main effect of Anxiety (β = -.20, p 
= .06), but no interaction, indicating lower levels of anxiety were associated with higher levels of 
facilitation to distress.  For self-report affective empathy, there were main effects of both CU  
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Table 9.  Hierarchical Regression Analyses with Callous Unemotional Traits and Anxiety 
as Predictors of Affective Empathy Measures 
Note.  *** = p < .001, ** = p < .01, 
†
 = p = .06.  All predictors were centered using sample means prior to 
entering them into regression analyses.  WASI IQ = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence – 
Intelligence quotient; ICU = Inventory of Callous Unemotional Traits; BES = Basic Empathy Scale.  
 
 
traits (β = -.27, p < .01) and Anxiety (β = .28, p < .01) that accounted for 18% of the variance but 
no interaction.  This pattern of findings indicate that higher levels of CU traits were associated 
with lower levels of self-report affective empathy but higher levels of Anxiety were associated 
with higher levels of self-reported affective empathy.   
Table 10 summarizes the results of the hierarchical regressions testing the interaction 
between CU traits and anxiety on cognitive empathy measures.  For self-report cognitive 
empathy there was a significant main effect of CU traits (β = -.27, p < .01) and a significant 
interaction between CU traits and Anxiety (β = -.28, p < .01).  The form of this interaction was 
explored and reported in Figure 1.  As reported in this figure, there was a non-significant 
association between CU traits and self-reported cognitive empathy at low levels of anxiety (β = -
 .01, p = .96).  However, there was a significant negative association between CU traits 
 Affective Empathy Measures 
 
 Dot Probe Facilitation BES Affective Empathy 
 
 β  R² ΔR² β  R² ΔR² 
 
WASI IQ -.07   -.10   
  .01   .01  
ICU -.12   -.27**   
Anxiety -.20
†
    .28**   
  .05 .04  .19 .18*** 
ICU X Anxiety -.16   -.11   
  .07 .02  .20 .01 
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Table 10.  Hierarchical Regression Analyses with Callous Unemotional Traits and Anxiety 
as Predictors of Cognitive Empathy Measures 
 
Note.  ** = p < .01, * = p < .05, 
†
 = p < .08.  All predictors were centered using sample means prior to 
entering them into regression analyses.  WASI IQ = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence – 
Intelligence quotient; ICU = Inventory of Callous Unemotional Traits; BES = Basic Empathy Scale; ToM  
= Theory of Mind.  
 
Figure 1.  Interaction between self-report cognitive empathy and callous-unemotional  
traits at high and low levels of anxiety. 
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 Cognitive Empathy Measures 
 BES Cognitive 
Empathy 
NimStim Facial 
Accuracy 
Affective ToM Cognitive ToM 
 
 β R² ΔR² β R² ΔR² β R² ΔR² β R² ΔR² 
WASI 
IQ 
.23**   .27**   .19†   .36***   
  .05   .08   .04   .13  
ICU -.27**   -.002    .09    .03   
Anxiety .13   -.10 .08 .01 -.20*   -.07   
  .16 .10**     .09 .05
†
  .14 .01 
ICU X 
Anxiety 
-.28**   -.14 .11 .02 -.12   -.20*   
  .24 .08**     .11 .01  .18 .04* 
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and self-reported cognitive empathy at high levels of anxiety (β = -.52, p < .001). 
 For affective ToM, there was a significant main effect of Anxiety (β = -.20, p < .05) but 
no significant interaction.  However, for cognitive ToM there was a significant interaction 
between CU traits and anxiety (β = -.20, p < .05).  This interaction was explored and the results 
are reported in Figure 2.  There was a negative but non-significant association between CU traits 
and cognitive ToM at high levels of anxiety (β = -.16, p = .21) and there was a trend for a 
positive association between CU traits and cognitive ToM at low levels of anxiety (β = .21, p 
= .10).
1
  There were no significant main effects or interactions for the regression analyses of the 
overall NimStim affective facial recognition task.   
 
Figure 2.  Interaction between cognitive theory of mind and callous-unemotional traits  
at high and low levels of anxiety. 
 
 
                                                        
1 When this analysis was run using two SD above and below the mean, the result indicated there was a non-
significant negative trend between CU traits and cognitive ToM at high levels of anxiety (β = -.34, p = .08). 
However, there was a significant positive association between CU traits and cognitive ToM at low levels of anxiety 
(β = .40, p < .05). 
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Table 11.  Hierarchical Regression Analyses with Callous Unemotional Traits and Anxiety as Predictors of Facial Accuracy 
  
Note.  ** = p < .01, * = p < .05, 
† 
= p = .07.  All predictors were centered using sample means prior to entering them into regression analyses.  
WASI IQ = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence – Intelligence quotient; ICU = Inventory of Callous Unemotional Traits 
 NimStim Affective Facial Task Accuracy 
 
 Happy Angry Fearful Disgust Neutral Sad 
 
 β R² ΔR² β R² ΔR² β R² ΔR² β R² ΔR² β R² ΔR² β R² ΔR² 
WASI 
IQ 
 .00    .22*    .15    .13    .22**    .01   
  .00   .05   .03   .02   .05   .00  
ICU  .05    .04    .13   -.20*   -.14   -.00   
Anxiety  .07   -.06   -.11   -.07   -.07   -.04   
  .01 .01  .05 .00  .06 .03  .07 .04  .07 .02  .00 .00 
ICU X 
Anxiety 
-.01   -.14   -.20*   -.18†   -.10    
 .06 
  
  .01 .00  .08 .02  .10 .04*  .10 .03†  .08 .01  .01 .00 
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Finally, a series of hierarchical regressions were conducted testing the interaction 
between CU traits and Anxiety for predicting the accuracy of the six sets of facial expressions 
(Table 11).  Results showed there was a significant interaction for CU traits and Anxiety on fear 
recognition accuracy (β = -.20, p < .05).  The form of this interaction was explored and provided 
in Figure 3.  There was a non-significant negative association between CU traits and fear 
recognition accuracy at high levels of anxiety (β = -.05, p = .71).  However, there was a 
significant positive association between CU traits and fear recognition at low levels of anxiety (β 
= .32, p < .05).  There was also a significant main effect of CU traits (β = -.20, p < .05) and a 
trend for significance for an interaction between CU traits and anxiety (β = -.18, p = .07) on 
disgust recognition accuracy.  There were no significant main effects or interactions for the other 
four facial expressions.   
Figure 3.  Interaction between fearful recognition accuracy and callous-unemotional traits 
at high and low levels of anxiety 
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Discussion 
The current study examined whether a sample of detained adolescents could be 
disaggregated into two distinct groups, consistent with past research on primary and secondary 
variants of psychopathy in adults (Skeem et al., 2003) and CU traits in adolescents (Kahn et al., 
2013).  The study also sought to determine a possible explanation for the lack of empathy among 
youth in the secondary variant by examining whether they differ from primary variants on 
measures of cognitive and affective empathy.  Latent profile analysis identified four groups of 
youth that differed on levels of CU traits and anxiety.  Two distinct groups of youths emerged 
that were high on CU traits and differed as predicted on anxiety reflecting a primary (low 
anxiety) and secondary (high anxiety) CU variant; two additional groups were identified that 
were both low on CU traits but differed on levels of anxiety (Low CU / High Anx vs. Low CU / 
Low Anx).   
Consistent with predictions, the secondary variant demonstrated the lowest levels of 
cognitive empathy on both self-report and computerized tasks, but the group comparisons for the 
primary and secondary variant were only significant on measures of affective and cognitive ToM 
and disgust recognition accuracy.  In contrast, the primary variant demonstrated the lowest levels 
of self-report affective empathy.  However, these levels were not significantly different than 
those exhibited by the secondary variant, suggesting that both primary and secondary variants 
may demonstrate relatively similar deficits in affective empathy.  While these results for 
affective empathy deficits across the primary and secondary variant are inconsistent with our 
hypotheses, they are aligned with past research that has consistently found evidence for affective 
empathy deficits across youth with high levels of CU traits (Chabrol et al., 2011; Dadds et al., 
2009; Dadds et al., 2012; Jones et al., 2010; Pardini & Byrd, 2012; Pardini et al., 2003).  
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Analyses of CU traits and anxiety in continuous form produced a mostly consistent 
pattern of results.  A significant interaction between CU traits and anxiety in predicting cognitive 
empathy measures suggested that those youth high on CU traits and high on anxiety demonstrate 
lower levels of self-reported cognitive empathy.  In addition, an interaction predicting cognitive 
ToM demonstrated that those youth high on CU traits and low on anxiety tended to score higher 
on a measure of cognitive ToM.  However, the slope for this interaction only became significant 
at two standard deviations.  These results were consistent with the hypothesis that youth in the 
secondary variant would exhibit more deficits than those in the primary variant on tasks 
assessing cognitive empathy, suggesting overall that youth in the primary variant may 
demonstrate fewer difficulties in perspective-taking as it relates to the understanding or 
attribution of another‟s mental state.   
Building upon previous work examining primary and secondary variants, the current 
study extends existing knowledge about the type of empathy deficits that may lead to the 
development of CU traits.  Specifically, these results suggest both primary and secondary 
variants may exhibit similar deficits in affective empathy, but that secondary variants may also 
exhibit deficits in cognitive empathy and perspective-taking that are not present in primary 
variants.  Although the link between CU traits with abuse and trauma was not tested directly in 
the current study, this link has been consistently documented in past research (see Kimonis et al., 
2012; Sharf et al., 2014).  The current results build on this past work by suggesting that this 
abuse and trauma experienced by the secondary group may lead to a bias in cognitive processing 
towards threatening or negative stimuli at the expense of being able to adequately detect other 
important aspects of the environment (Pollak, 2008; Masten et al., 2008; Shackman, Shackman, 
& Pollak, 2007; Shields & Cicchetti, 1998).  Thus, persons in the secondary group may dedicate 
 46 
 
less cognitive resources to non-threat related emotions, such as distress in others, leading to 
problems in their perspective-taking.  Consistent with this possibility, compared to children 
without a history of maltreatment, maltreated children are less accurate at identifying emotional 
facial expressions (Camras, Grow, & Ribordy, 1983; Camras et al., 1990; During & McMahon, 
1991; Pears & Fisher, 2005) and often show problems in emotion regulation that interfere with 
perspective-taking (Pollak, 2008; Shields & Cicchetti, 1998) and empathy (Straker & Jacobson, 
1981; Main & George, 1985).  
 Findings for the current study may also help explain the mixed results in past research 
that have examined the association between CU traits and performance on measures of cognitive 
empathy or perspective-taking.  For instance, some studies have shown that youth with high 
levels of CU traits show deficits in cognitive empathy when measured by affective facial 
recognition (Dadds et al., 2009) or self-reports of perspective-taking (Chabrol et al., 2011; 
Pardini et al., 2003).  At the same time, studies using similar tasks of emotion recognition 
(Schwenck et al., 2012; Dadds et al., 2012) or cognitive perspective-taking (Anastassiou-
Hadjicharalambous & Warden, 2008; Cheng et al., 2012; Jones et al., 2010) found youth high on 
CU traits did not show deficits in cognitive empathy.  These studies did not account for the 
heterogeneity within this secondary subgroup of adolescents nor measure the comorbid influence 
of anxiety, which could account for the conflicting findings in the research. 
The current study also found a significant interaction between CU traits and anxiety in 
the prediction of fear recognition accuracy.  This interaction suggested that those youth who are 
high on CU traits, but low on anxiety, demonstrate higher accuracy for recognition of fearful 
facial expressions.  A large body of research has found links between high levels of CU traits and 
abnormalities in emotional processing (see Frick et al., 2014 for a review).  Evidence from this 
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line of research has consistently shown that youth with CU traits exhibit reduced emotional 
reactivity or arousal to distress cues and emotional pictures/words (Blair et al., 1999; Kimonis et 
al., 2006; Loney et al., 2003; Sharp, Van Goozen, & Goodyer, 2006).  However, the research 
examining the association between CU traits and affective facial recognition has produced more 
mixed results.  For example, some studies have found an association between CU traits and 
deficits in fear recognition (Blair & Coles, 2000; Blair, Colledge, Murray, & Mitchell, 2001) 
whereas others have not (Loney et al., 2003; Woodworth & Waschbusch, 2008).  Deficits in the 
recognition of other emotions have not been consistently found, although one study reported that 
CU traits were negatively associated with disgust recognition deficits (Sylvers, Brennan, & 
Lilienfeld, 2011).  
Results from the current study add to previous research on emotional recognition and 
suggest that any deficits in facial recognition, particularly fear and disgust, may be specific to 
youth with CU traits who also have high levels of anxiety (i.e., secondary variant).  In contrast, 
the current results revealed that CU traits were positively related to fear recognition accuracy 
with the primary group scoring the highest on fear recognition accuracy.  These results indicate 
youth with high levels of CU traits and low levels of anxiety (i.e., primary variant) may actually 
be more accurate than other detained youth in recognizing fearful expressions.  In other words, 
youth in the primary variant may be more adept at recognizing fear in others despite their 
reduced emotional reactivity when to viewing fear or distress in others (Blair et al., 2004; Cheng 
et al., 2012; Kimonis et al., 2006).  This is consistent with early theoretical work proposing low 
fear or deficient emotional response to aversive stimuli as the underlying core deficit in 
psychopathy (Lykken, 1957).  Further, the success in the recognition of fearful expressions is 
consistent with Cleckley‟s early work, which suggests that individuals with psychopathic traits 
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may have an enhanced ability to notice when others are vulnerable and this ability may facilitate 
their manipulative behavior or ability to use others for their own gain (Cleckley, 1941).   
Limitations 
Several limitations qualify these results.  First, the sample size for the secondary variant 
(n = 10) was relatively small for group comparisons and this may have attenuated our ability to 
detect significant group differences in post hoc comparisons.  In addition, recent research on 
primary and secondary variants in a community sample also found low base rates for a secondary 
variant (Humayun, Kahn, Frick, & Viding, 2014) and this variant also tends to make up smaller 
portions of the population in forensic samples as well (e.g., Kimonis et al., 2012).  These lower 
rates of the secondary variant suggest that the development of CU traits within this variant may 
reflect a more atypical developmental pathway, at least within these types of settings.  A second 
limitation in the current study is that we examined only adolescents who were arrested and being 
held at a secure detention facility prior to adjudication.  The use of a detained population allowed 
for a sample of youth with higher levels of CU traits, but may limit the generalizability of the 
results to non-detained youth populations.  Thus, future research should replicate these findings 
in clinic-referred and community samples as well as with children prior to adolescence in order 
to gain a broader understanding of the developmental sequence of empathy and the role it plays 
in the development of CU traits.  
This latter recommendation is especially important given that the accuracy of cognitive 
empathy or perspective-taking skills appears to improve with age.  For instance, the development 
of advanced perspective-taking skills only begins to solidify in ages 9 to 11 (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1999).  In addition, performance on measures of facial recognition specifically, indicate an 
increase in accuracy starting somewhere between the ages of 11 (Tonks et al., 1997) to 13 years 
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old (Kolb et al.1992).  These critical periods in the development of cognitive empathy or 
perspective-taking skills may be important to consider in future research in the selection of age 
ranges for the participants as well as their association in the development of CU traits.  Indeed, 
Dadds and colleagues (2009) found that youth with CU traits may be more likely to exhibit 
deficits in cognitive empathy prior to age 9 but these deficits appear to diminish with age.  While, 
these effects could be due to critical periods of development in these skills, it is also possible that 
youth with CU traits experience delays in the development of perspective-taking skills due to 
their deficits in affective empathy.  This theory would be consistent with developmental models 
of empathy that suggest cognitive empathy arises and develops out of affective experiences or 
affective empathy (Singer, 2006; Hoffman, 1984).  However, this would not explain why the 
secondary group would continue to have deficits or delays in the development of cognitive 
empathy or perspective-taking skills into adolescence.  It may be that difficulties in emotion 
regulation within this group play a role in maintaining these perspective-taking deficits over time. 
It may also be important to consider the role of gender in the development of CU traits, 
especially with regard to the role it plays in these distinct developmental pathways.  Prior 
research in empathy development (e.g., Hoffman, 1977; Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, & Emde, 1992) 
as well as CU traits (e.g., Dadds et al., 2009) suggests that girls may differ from boys in their 
levels of empathy and CU traits.  For instance, in studies of children and adolescents, girls tend 
to score higher on empathy on self-reports (de Wied et al., 2007; Mestre, Samper, Dolores, & 
Tur, 2009), parent reports (Auyeung et al., 2009) or a combination of parent report and 
laboratory task involving emotional videos (Strayer & Roberts, 2004).  At the same time, levels 
of CU traits tend to be lower in girls (e.g., Essau et al., 2006; Sevecke, Kosson, & Krischer, 
2009) and research on emotion recognition in girls with CU traits has been mixed with some 
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research suggesting deficits in the recognition of sad facial expressions (Fairchild et al., 2010) 
and others showing enhanced fear recognition (Schwenck, Gensthaler, Romanos, Freitag, 
Schneider, & Taurines, 2014).  In addition, Dadds and colleagues (2009) found that high levels 
of CU traits in girls were not associated with deficits in affective empathy, but primarily related 
to deficits in cognitive empathy.  These differences in levels of CU traits and types of empathy 
deficits among girls with CU traits suggest gender may be an important factor when investigating 
developmental pathways of these traits.  Further, other research has shown that the strength of 
genetic and environmental effects on CU traits may vary across gender (Fontaine, Rijsdijk, 
McCrory, & Viding, 2010) with shared environmental factors largely accounting for membership 
in a stable high CU trajectory for girls and heritability largely accounting for membership in this 
group for boys (Fontaine et al., 2010).  Additionally, outcomes of children with CU traits have 
been shown to differ to some degree for boys and girls (Javdani, Sadeh, & Verona, 2011; 
Wymbs et al., 2012).  For example, CU traits in adolescent girls were associated with lower risk 
for suicide attempts (Javdani et al., 2011) as well as lower risk for recurrent alcohol, marijuana, 
and substance use impairment compared to boys with similar levels of these traits (Wymbs et al., 
2012).  Taken together, these differences in trajectories and outcomes between boys and girls 
with CU traits suggest future research should continue to explore potential gender differences 
within primary and secondary pathways.  
An additional limitation of the current study involves the computerized task of emotional 
reactivity (Emotional Pictures Dot-Probe Task) used to assess affective empathy.  Although the 
findings were non-significant, the pattern of findings for the facilitation index to distress on this 
task were in contrast with previous research showing that the primary variant exhibits more 
deficits in facilitation to distress compared to the secondary variant (e.g., Kimonis et al., 2012).  
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In the current sample, the secondary variant had the slowest response times (indicative of worse 
facilitation) compared to the other groups.  This divergence in findings may again be due, in part, 
to the small number of youth in the current sample who were identified in the secondary variant 
(n = 10).  In addition, past research using the emotional pictures dot-probe task (e.g., Kimonis et 
al., 2012) has used a measure of abuse/trauma to distinguish secondary variants from primary 
variants.  Since the current study did not assess for exposure to abuse or trauma, this may have 
played a role in our divergent findings for this task.  
Conclusions 
Within the context of these limitations, the results support past research suggesting that 
youths high on CU traits fall into two distinct variants (i.e., primary and secondary).  The unique 
contribution of the current study are the findings that these variants may demonstrate different 
levels of cognitive empathy and associated perspective-taking abilities, but show similar deficits 
in affective empathy.  Thus, the secondary variant demonstrates deficits across both cognitive 
and affective empathy, while the primary variant shows deficits largely related to affective 
empathy.  These differences in cognitive empathy deficits are consistent with past research and 
theory (e.g., Kimonis et al., 2012; Skeem et al., 2003), suggesting that there may be distinct 
etiological pathways for each group.  Specifically, the development of CU traits in the secondary 
variant may result from problems in emotional and behavioral regulation that could be the result 
of experiencing abuse and other trauma early in development (Kimonis et al., 2012).  Emotional 
deficits in the primary variant, on the other hand, may be related to low levels of emotional 
reactivity that can interfere with the development of the affective components of conscience, 
such as affective empathy and guilt (Kimonis et al., 2012). 
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These presumed differences in etiologies and empathy deficits between the two CU 
variants are important for developing hypotheses about targeted interventions for youth with 
these traits.  A growing body of research indicates that intensive treatment can successfully 
reduce severe conduct problems and aggression in youth with CU traits (Kolko & Pardini, 2010; 
Waschbusch, Carrey, Willoughby, King, & Andrade, 2007).  It is possible that even greater gains 
can be made if treatments are tailored to the unique characteristics of the CU variants 
demonstrated in this and previous studies.  For example, research suggests that cognitive-
behavioral interventions may be effective treatment for internalizing problems (e.g., anxiety, 
depression, and anger) and related trauma histories that distinguish secondary variants (e.g., 
Kimonis et al., 2012; Kahn et al., 2013).  As a result, these treatments may also be beneficial for 
those in the secondary group.  In addition, considering the current study found evidence for 
deficits in cognitive empathy and perspective-taking skills in this group, this may be an 
important area to target for secondary variants within treatment or intervention paradigms.  For 
the primary variant, prior research has shown that these youth respond positively to reward-only 
behavioral treatment (e.g., Hawes & Dadds, 2005).  Results from the current study suggest that 
treatments or interventions may also benefit from taking into consideration the deficits in 
emotional reactivity among these youth while capitalizing on their potential strengths in 
perspective-taking.  In summary, recent years have brought about several promising 
interventions for youths with CU traits.  Accounting for the heterogeneity among youth with CU 
traits, including these differences in cognitive empathy and perspective-taking, could help to 
enhance these intervention efforts and allow treatment to be tailored more to the individual needs 
of the youth.  
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